The Sixteen Fears: China’s Strategic Psychology. Michael Pillsbury, Survival, Fall 2012, pp. 149-182. "Understanding the cultural environment of Chinese military strategists can help determine the best ways to either reassure Beijing or steer it away from disruptive policies." READ MORE

China and the 'Pivot. Lanxin Xiang, Survival, Fall 2012, pp. 113-128. "From Beijing’s perspective, many symbolic acts in Washington point to the emergence of a new cold war. A new generation of leaders may show greater willingness to confront America’s mindset head-on." READ MORE

The Problem With the Pivot. Foreign Affairs. Robert S. Ross, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2012, var. pages. "The Obama administration has responded to Chinese assertiveness by reinforcing U.S. military and diplomatic links to the Asia-Pacific, to much acclaim at home and in the region. But the 'pivot' is based on a serious misreading of its target. China remains far weaker than the United States and is deeply insecure. To make Beijing more cooperative, Washington should work to assuage China’s anxieties, not exploit them." READ MORE

China’s Free Trade Agreement Strategies - Fall 2012, The Washington Quarterly, Guoyou Song and Wen Jin Yuan, Fall 2012, pp. 107-119. "Many in China fear that the United States’ Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) framework seeks to coopt or destroy regional economic cooperation, leading Beijing to devise strategies to respond, including constructing its own regional web of FTAs or even joining TPP itself." READ MORE

China’s Unilateral Sanctions. James Reilly, The Washington Quarterly, Fall 2012, pp. 121-133. "Over the past few years, Chinese experts began to clear some of their legendary legal, moral, ideological, and practical hurdles to using unilateral sanctions. While significant constraints remain, policymakers cannot ignore that Beijing is now exploring their use." READ MORE

Bucking Beijing. Aaron L. Friedberg, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2012, pp. 48-58 “IN CONTRAST to its Cold War strategy of containment, Washington's current approach to China is not the product of a deliberate planning process. It is nowhere codified in official documents. Indeed, it does not even have a name. Still, for the better part of two decades, the United States has pursued a broadly consistent two-pronged strategy combining engagement and balancing. U.S. presidents from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama have worked to engage China through diplomacy, trade, scientific cooperation, and educational and cultural exchange.” READ MORE
 
The China Card: Playing Politics with Sino-American Relations. Peter Trubowitz and Jungkun Seo, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2012, pp. 189-211. “Peter Trubowitz and Jungkun Seo examine how and when China emerged as a ‘hot button’ issue in American politics. They show that the politicization of Sino-American relations has had as much to do with geopolitical considerations as well as electoral strategizing in the United States.” READ MORE

Weapons of Mass Urban Destruction. Peter Calthorpe, Foreign Policy, Sep/Oct 2012, var. pages. “China's cities are making the same mistake America's did on the path to superpower status.” READ MORE

Troubled Waters: China's Claims and the South China Sea. Jacques deLisle, Orbis, 15 September 15, 2012, pp. 608-642. “Among China's unresolved frontier questions, the South China Sea has become the most complex and troubled, and arguably the most significant and disconcerting. The economic and security stakes are high and the stake-holding states numerous and diverse. The claims that China (and others) make about the region reflect such interests but they are, ultimately, legal claims. Beijing's assertions of rights to the disputed areas have rested on three conceptually distinct grounds. Each presents a different mix of challenge and accommodation to international legal norms and the interests of other states, including China's neighbors, near-neighbors and the United States.” READ MORE

How China Sees America. Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Foreign Affairs, Sep/October 2012, pp 32-47. "United States worries about China’s rise, but Washington rarely considers how the world looks through Beijing’s eyes. Even when U.S. officials speak sweetly and softly, their Chinese counterparts hear sugarcoated threats and focus on the big stick in the background. America should not shrink from setting out its expectations of Asia’s rising superpower -- but it should do so calmly, coolly, and professionally." READ MORE 

War with China. James Dobbins, Survival, August-September 2012, pp. 7-24. Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, China has become America’s default adversary, the power against which the United States measures itself militarily, at least when there is not a more proximate enemy in sight. Before
9/11, George W. Bush identifi ed China as America’s prime threat, but once the ‘war on terrorism’ was launched China becam e a strategic partner. Now, in 2012, with America’s war in Iraq over, the one in Afghanistan winding down
and al-Qaeda on the ropes, President Barack Obama has announced yet another national-security pivot to Asia, with China again the main preoccupation.  READ MORE

China's Geostrategic Search for Oil. John Lee. The Washington Quarterly, Jul 1, 2012, var. pp. The real threat from Beijing’s geostrategic energy security strategy is not the risk of conflict or even energy insecurity, where their leverage is actually limited, but the detrimental effect on Western efforts to improve global governance standards, human rights, economic reform, and order. READ MORE

China’s Post-Socialist Inequality. Martin King Whyte, Current History, September 2012, pp. 229-234. "The country’s sharp increase in income inequality is not the result of the rich getting richer while the poor become poorer." READ MORE

The China Threat and the "Pivot" to Asia. Hugh De Santis, Current History, September 2012, pp. 209-215. "America’s expanding military footprint in Asia may be more of a provocation than a deterrent to China’s aggressive behavior." READ MORE

Head of State. Hillary Clinton, the blind dissident, and the art of diplomacy in the Twitter era. Susan B. Glasser, Foreign Policy, July/August 2012, var. pp.   Secretary of State Hillary Clinton sat down on a plush yellow couch at the J.W. Marriott late on a Saturday morning in early May. The Beijing skyline sparkled, uncharacteristically sunny and smog-free, out the window of her 23rd-floor suite, and she was wearing sunglasses even though we were indoors, "an eye infection," she said apologetically. Clinton seemed surprisingly upbeat, especially considering that just a day earlier, she had come uncomfortably close to a major public rebuff by the Chinese -- much closer, in fact, than anyone yet realized. "It was a standoff," she told me, "for 24 difficult hours." READ MORE

State Capitalism: Can state-run economies sustain their success? Jason McLure, CQ Global Researcher, May 15, 2012, var. pages. “Since the 2008 financial crisis China, Russia and Saudi Arabia have been among the best-performing economies in the world. All three countries practice so-called state capitalism, in which the government plays a dominant role in the economy and owns a large share of the nation's companies. As economic growth in the United States and Japan remains tepid, and parts of the European Union are mired in a double-dip recession, many developing world governments are questioning whether Western market capitalism is the best path for growth. Many also blame the excesses of unfettered Western-style capitalism for the recent global financial crisis and the ensuing worldwide recession. China, on the other hand, has lifted 600 million people out of poverty in three decades, and Russia's economy has doubled in size since Vladimir Putin began rolling back post-Soviet free-market reforms. Some economists see trouble ahead, however, because when governments manipulate markets for political purposes it can lead to inefficiencies, corruption and political tensions over time.” READ MORE

Dusk, Dawn, and High Noon: Demographic Trends Forecast Next Phases for China, India, and the United States. Martin C. Libicki and Julie DaVanzo, Rand Review, Winter 2011-2012, var. pages.  “Much has been written since October about the world’s population having passed 7 billion, but little attention has been paid to the implications of recent demographic changes for the world’s nations and regions relative to one another. In this article, we turn our focus to the demographic futures and related economic prospects facing China, India, and the United States over the next several decades. The trends in these countries reflect just some of the shifts in power to which the world has already, literally, given birth. How the countries respond will determine their ultimate fates.” READ MORE

America's Pivot to East Asia: The Naval Dimension Christian Le Mière, Survival, June/June 2012,pp. 81-94. "Washington and Beijing have established a pattern of nervous, ostentatious behaviour, whereby each attempts to demonstrate its ability and intent to deter aggression while avoiding direct confrontation. The announcement of a reformed US defence strategy by President Barack Obama and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta in early January 2012 confirmed a pivot towards the Asia-Pacific as commitments to war fighting in the Middle East and Central Asia subside. Obama, Panetta and General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, briefed reporters on 5 January on America's new strategic guidance document, 'Sustaining US Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense'. The product of a review of US defence priorities 'at a moment of transition' for the nation, the document notes that the United States will 'of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region'. The principle of the Asia pivot was also signalled by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in a November 2011 Foreign Policy article in which she noted that 'one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will … be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region'. READ MORE

The Climate Threat We Can Beat. David G. Victor, Charles F. Kennel, Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2012, var. pages. "For too long, climate diplomacy has focused on carbon dioxide. But at least 40 percent of global warming can be blamed on shorter-lived pollutants, which also cause disease and damage crops in developing states. Reining in pollution would thus accomplish two goals, while finally getting countries such as China and India into the climate-change business. READ MORE

Confronting a Powerful China with Western Characteristics. James Kurth, Orbis, Winter 2012, pp. 39-59. “The rapid rise of Chinese economic and military power has produced the most fundamental change in the global system since the end of the Cold War, and it poses vital questions about China's future direction. Many Western analysts argue that China's great power will cause it to become more like the West, i.e., like Western great powers. Other Western analysts believe that China will continue to be the same, i.e., like the China of the past few decades. An alternative interpretation, however, is that China's new power will enable it to become even more Chinese than it is now, i.e., to become more like the traditional and imperial China that existed before the Western intrusions of the 19th century.” READ MORE

Pivot but Hedge: A Strategy for Pivoting to Asia While Hedging in the Middle East. David W. Barno, Nora Bensahel, Travis Sharp, Orbis, Spring 2012, var. pages. “The U.S. government's new emphasis on the Asia-Pacific represents a bold strategic choice that could animate U.S. national security policy for years to come. Yet the United States must balance its rightful new focus on the Asia-Pacific with the volatility that still exists in other areas of the world. The United States should pivot to the Asia-Pacific—but to protect its vital interests, it should also hedge against threats elsewhere, particularly in the greater Middle East. To implement a “Pivot but Hedge” strategy, the U.S. government should do three things. First, it should exercise caution when cutting the defense budget. Second, it should give the military services greater leadership roles in specific regions: naval and air forces should lead in the Asia-Pacific, while ground forces should lead in the greater Middle East. Third, it should maintain expansible, capable, and well-trained ground forces as a hedge against global uncertainty.” READ MORE

The United States and Asia in 2011: Obama Determined to Bring America "Back" to Asia. Douglas Paal, Asian Survey, Jan/Feb 2012, pp. 6-14. “The Obama administration moved to stabilize 2010's deteriorating relations with China and exploit the opportunity to deepen ties with China's nervous neighbors. Diplomatic, economic, and security initiatives were melded to “rebalance” American resources and attention to Asia in the 21st century. Early 2011 euphoria about China's rise and gloom about America's decline began to reverse themselves by end 2011. Obama made a key policy statement about the Asia-Pacific region in his address to Australia's Parliament.” READ MORE

Extended nuclear deterrence in East Asia: redundant or resurgent? Andrew O'Neil, International Affairs, Nov 2011, pp. 1439-1457.  “A number of commentators have claimed that the strategic relevance of extended nuclear deterrence is declining in the twenty-first century. This claim is based on three key arguments. First, that the positive effects of extended nuclear deterrence have been exaggerated by its proponents; second, that the rational actor logic underpinning extended nuclear deterrence is increasingly redundant; and third, that extended deterrence using conventional weapons is equally, if not more, effective as extended nuclear deterrence. This article applies these arguments to East Asia, a region where nuclear weapons continue to loom large in states' security equations. In applying each of the above arguments to the East Asian context, the analysis finds that not only is extended nuclear deterrence alive and kicking in the region, but also that in the coming decades it is likely to become more central to the strategic policies of the United States and its key allies, Japan and South Korea. Despite predictions of its demise, US extended nuclear deterrence remains a critical element in East Asia's security order and will remain so for the foreseeable future.” READ MORE

Bombs Away? Being Realistic about Deep Nuclear Reductions. James M. Acton, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2012, pp. 37-53. “There are about 22,000 nuclear warheads in the world today. Reducing that number—eventually to zero—is a major element of U.S. President Barack Obama’s foreign policy. To date, his administration’s progress toward this goal has been modest, even with agreement on a new round of U.S.–Russian cuts with the New START treaty. Nonetheless, opponents of his agenda, particularly in Congress, worry that any further arms control will pitch the United States down a slippery slope toward zero. Simultaneously, supporters increasingly complain that Obama has not been bold enough. Their frustration, which is felt in capitals across the world, risks compromising the willingness of key states to support important U.S. foreign policy objectives, especially those related to nonproliferation. Neither these fears nor these frustrations are fair. Skeptics and supporters tend to ignore the practical realities of deep reductions. Nuclear-armed states will only agree to deep reductions if at least three demanding conditions are met: arms build-ups in China, India, and Pakistan must be stabilized; nuclear-armed states—especially Russia and China—will have to be convinced that arms control will not undermine the survivability of their nuclear forces; and nuclear-armed states will have to be satisfied that reductions will not exacerbate existing imbalances in conventional forces.” READ MORE

The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations. Henry Kissinger, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2012, var. pages. “Significant groups in both China and the United States claim that a contest for supremacy between the two countries is inevitable and perhaps already under way. They are wrong. Bejing and Washington may not, in the end, be able to transcend the forces pushing them toward conflict. But they owe it to themselves, and the world, to try.” READ MORE

China and East Asian Democracy: The Coming Wave. Larry Diamond. Current History, January 2012, pp. 5-13. ”If there is going to be a great advance of democracy in this decade, it is most likely going to emanate from East Asia.” READ MORE

China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure. Michael Beckley, International Security, Winter 2011/12, pp. 41–78. “Two assumptions dominate current foreign policy debates in the United States and China. First, the United States is in decline relative to China. Second, much of this decline is the result of globalization and the hegemonic burdens the United States bears to sustain globalization. Both of these assumptions are wrong. The United States is not in decline; in fact, it is now wealthier, more innovative, and more militarily powerful compared to China than it was in 1991. Moreover, globalization and hegemony do not erode U.S. power; they reinforce it. The United States derives competitive advantages from its hegemonic position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit. The United States should therefore continue to prop up the global economy and maintain a robust diplomatic and military presence abroad.” READ MORE

Confronting A Powerful China With Western Characteristics. James Kurth, Orbis, Winter 2012, pp. 39–59. “The rapid rise of Chinese economic and military power has produced the most fundamental change in the global system since the end of the Cold War, and it poses vital questions about China's future direction. Many Western analysts argue that China's great power will cause it to become more like the West, i.e., like Western great powers. Other Western analysts believe that China will continue to be the same, i.e., like the China of the past few decades. An alternative interpretation, however, is that China's new power will enable it to become even more Chinese than it is now, i.e., to become more like the traditional and imperial China that existed before the Western intrusions of the 19th century.” READ MORE

The Patterns of History. Francis Fukuyama, Current History, January 2012, pp. 14-26. “The legitimacy and appeal of democracy in East Asia will depend on how democratic countries in the region stack up against China.” READ MORE

Cooperation and Conflict in the U.S.-China Petroleum Relationship. Jonathan Chanis, American Foreign Policy Interests, 1 November 2011, pp. 286-292. “Current U.S. and Chinese petroleum import dependence differ sharply, and the respective vulnerability of each state to future supply disruptions should further strengthen the U.S. power position and weaken China's power position. In an effort to minimize present and future petroleum vulnerability, China has been pursuing neo-mercantilist policies and favoring relations with states hostile to the United States. These polices continually place China in conflict with the United States, particularly since they challenge the international petroleum security and trading regime that largely was built by, and is currently supported by, the United States. While in the past, the United States and China have formally discussed “energy security,“ these meetings tend to avoid the real points of difficulty in each country's pursuit of petroleum supply security.” READ MORE

The South China Sea Is the Future of Conflict. The 21st century's defining battleground is going to be on water.  Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Policy, Sept/Oct 2011, var. pp."Europe is a landscape; East Asia a seascape. Therein lies a crucial difference between the 20th and 21st centuries. The most contested areas of the globe in the last century lay on dry land in Europe, particularly in the flat expanse that rendered the eastern and western borders of Germany artificial and exposed to the inexorable march of armies. But over the span of the decades, the demographic and economic axis of the Earth has shifted measurably to the opposite end of Eurasia, where the spaces between major population centers are overwhelmingly maritime. Because of the way geography illuminates and sets priorities, these physical contours of East Asia augur a naval century -- naval being defined here in the broad sense to include both sea and air battle formations now that they have become increasingly inextricable. Why? China, which, especially now that its land borders are more secure than at any time since the height of the Qing dynasty at the end of the 18th century, is engaged in an undeniable naval expansion. It is through sea power that China will psychologically erase two centuries of foreign transgressions on its territory -- forcing every country around it to react." READ MORE

China’s Cybersecurity Challenges and Foreign Policy. Gao Fei, Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Fall 2011, pp. 185-190. "For the People’s Republic of China’s first thirty years of history (1949-1978), Chinese foreign security policy focused mainly on protecting its sovereignty and preventing invasion. Since then, China has shifted its focus to economic development. While the rise of the information age and the modern technological revolution facilitated the country’s transition, these shifts have also engendered new challenges. Cybersecurity is one such challenge, and has emerged as a major Chinese national security issue. China is Increasingly Dependent on the Internet Internet penetration and use are growing rapidly in China. As of December 2010, China had 457 million Internet users, an increase of 73.3 million from the previous year. Overall Internet penetration has climbed to 34.3 percent of the population, an increase of 5.4 percent compared to the end of 2009. Broadband use is also growing quickly. By December 2010, China had 450 million broadband users (including DSL, cable, optical access, power line communication, Ethernet, and mobile broadband users), and 98.3 percent of the Chinese population used a broadband connection to access the Internet in the first half of 2010." READ MORE

Why John J. Mearsheimer Is Right (About Some Things). Robert D. Kaplan, The Atlantic, January/February 2012, var. pages. "'A disgrace' and 'anti-Semite' were two of the (more printable) barbs launched last fall at John Mearsheimer, a renowned political scientist at the University of Chicago. But Mearsheimer’s infamous views on Israel—in the latest case, his endorsement of a book on Jewish identity that many denounced as anti-Semitic—should not distract us from the importance of his life’s work: a bracing argument in favor of the doctrine of 'offensive realism,' which can enable the United States to avert decline and prepare for the unprecedented challenge posed by a rising China." READ MORE

Balancing the East, Upgrading the West Zbigniew Brzezinski, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2012, var. pages.  "As the United States looks ahead, it faces two central challenges in foreign policy, writes a former national security adviser: enlarging the zone of prosperity and democracy in the West while balancing the rise of China and allaying the fears of the United States’ Asian allies. Neither challenge can be addressed in isolation -- for today, the fates of the West and the East are intertwined." READ MORE

China: Big Changes Coming Soon. Henry S. Rowen, Policy Review, December 2011, var. pp. Big changes are ahead for China, probably abrupt ones. The economy has grown so rapidly for many years, over 30 years at an average of nine percent a year, that its size makes it a major player in trade and finance and increasingly in political and military matters. This growth is not only of great importance internationally, it is already having profound domestic social effects and it is bound to have internal political ones — sooner or later. Two kinds of changes are in store: political and economic. The order in which they occur will affect their impacts, and that order is very uncertain. In any case, big discontinuities are likely before 2020. READ MORE

How Walmart Is Changing China. Orville Schell, The Atlantic, December 2011, var. pp. The world’s biggest corporation and the world’s most populous nation have launched a bold experiment in consumer behavior and environmental stewardship: to set green standards for 20,000 suppliers making several hundred thousand items sold to billions of shoppers worldwide. Will that effort take hold, or will it unravel in a recriminatory tangle of misguided expectations and broken promises? READ MORE

Perspective: Could China Be the Next Wave? Bruce Gilley, Current History, November 2011, pp. 331-333. "China’s one-party state is here to stay, many observers agree. Then again, Samuel Huntington in 1984 assessed the odds of regime change in the communist world as 'virtually nil.'" READ MORE

The Return of Gunboat Diplomacy. Christian Le Mière, Survival, October-November 2011, pp. 53-68. "Gunboat diplomacy, never entirely absent from Asian waters, has seen a recent resurgence. Its implications for stability in East Asia may be more positive than first appears." READ MORE

China’s Rural Economy and the Rule of Law. Elizabeth Pond, Survival, October-November 2011, pp. 89-106. "The party hierarchy may soon have to make a choice between enforcing legal protections or reneging on the commitment to lift the peasantry from poverty." READ MORE

China and India: Awkward Ascents. Joshi Shashank, Orbis, Fall 2011, pp. 558-576. "This article surveys the key loci of Sino-Indian tension, situating them within the context of a classical if uneven security dilemma. It then examines the sources of stability within the relationship, arguing that the scope and intensity of conflict is attenuated by a series of military, political, economic and other factors. Lastly, the essay discusses the implications of the analysis for external powers, and the possible trajectories of the relationship." READ MORE

The Inevitable Superpower. Why China's Dominance is a Sure Thing. Arvind Subramanian. Foreign Affairs/PIIE, September/October 2011, var. pp. Is China poised to take over from the United States as the world's leading economy? Yes, judging by its GSP, trade flows, and ability to act as a creditor to the rest of the world. In fact, China's economic dominance will be far greater and come about far sooner than most observers realize. READ MORE 

The Middling Kingdom. Salvatore Babones,  Foreign Affairs, September/October 2011, var. pp. Sure, China’s economic growth has been unprecedented, even miraculous. But the country is unlikely to keep up its breakneck pace. Instead, China’s growth should level out soon, returning to rates more like those of comparable middle-income countries, such as Brazil, Mexico, and Russia. READ MORE

No “Jasmine” for China. Bruce J. Dickson, Current History, September 2011, pp. 211-216. "Political protests in China are a far cry from those that created the Arab Spring.” China’s leaders seem nervous. Despite presiding over a rapidly growing economy and an ever-increasing presence in international affairs, they remain wary of the potential of a popular upsurge that would threaten their hold on power. For this reason, they crack down hard on real or perceived efforts to promote popular protests. While their actions can seem heavyhanded and exaggerated to outside observers, the consistency of their responses to signs of protest indicates that they remain insecure about the stability of the regime. Most recently, they responded to the “Jasmine Revolution” in Tunisia and the uprising in Egypt earlier this year by blocking news of the unfolding events and temporarily censoring internet searches—including for the word jasmine, even though jasmine is a popular variety of tea in China and the topic of a well-known traditional song. READ MORE

After Unipolarity: China's Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline. Randall L. Schweller, Xiaoyu Pu, International Security, Summer 2011, pp. 41-72. "The emerging transition from unipolarity to a more multipolar distribution of global power presents a unique and unappreciated problem that largely explains why, contrary to the expectations of balance of power theory, a counterbalancing reaction to U.S. primacy has not yet taken place. The problem is that, under unipolarity and only unipolarity, balancing is a revisionist, not a status quo, behavior: its purpose is to replace the existing unbalanced unipolar structure with a balance of power system." READ MORE

Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese Energy Security Strategy. Tessman Brock, Wolfe Wojtek, International Studies Review, June 2011, pp. 214–240. "Between 2000 and 2010, Chinese NOCs signed billion-dollar investment deals involving equity ownership of oil resources in countries like Iran, Venezuela, Nigeria, and Kazakhstan (US Energy Information Administration 2009). In other countries like Angola, the PRC subsidized NOC investment with hundreds of millions of dollars in economic assistance (Simao 2008). CNPC, largest of the NOCs, has financed port construction in Sudan, Pakistan, and Myanmar (Niazi 2005; Storey 2006). In 2006, it opened an overland pipeline from Kazakhstan into China through the city of Urumqi and in October 2009, CNPC began construction of a 500-mile overland oil and gas pipeline through from the Myanmar coast to the Yunnan city of Kunming (Blanchard and Aizhu 2010)." READ MORE

International Trade and US Relations with China. Benjamin O. Fordham and Katja B. Kleinberg, Foreign Policy Analysis, July 2011, pp.  217–236. "US relations with China are critically important for the future of world politics. They are also a useful case in which to test the individual-level implications of the liberal commercial peace argument. A plausible case can be made on both sides of the claim that China poses a security threat to the United States. China’s economy is growing far faster than the United States’ economy, while the country remains a communist autocracy. At the same time, trade between the United States and China has expanded dramatically in the last three decades. Its dual role as a major trading partner and a growing international rival generates substantial uncertainty about China’s future status as friend or foe. Using data from a recent survey by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, we find that economic interests help explain individual Americans’ assessment of China as a threat and their views concerning hostile policies toward that country. Those who stand to benefit from trade with China hold more positive views of the country and oppose conflictual foreign policies with respect to it. Those whose incomes are likely to decline because of trade with China tend to take the opposite position on these questions." READ MORE

Paper Tiger? Chinese Soft Power in East Asia. Gregory G. Holyk, Political Science Quarterly, Summer 2011, pp. 223-254. "Gregory G. Holyk uses survey data to examine the supposed rise of Chinese soft power and parallel decline of U.S. soft power in East Asia. He finds that contrary to conventional wisdom, Chinese soft power is relatively weak, while U.S. soft power remains strong." READ MORE

Cyberwar: The United States and China Prepare For the Next Generation of Conflict. George Patterson Manson, Comparative Strategy, Apr/June 2011, pp. 121-133. "In recent years the People's Republic of China has garnered international attention for its aggressive and often sophisticated employment of cyber capabilities against domestic and international targets alike. With increasing frequency, the targets of Chinese cyber operations are American companies or government networks. If the United States and China find themselves in conflict in the coming decades, this newest arena of operations, cyberwarfare, will play a decisive role in determining the outcome. This article examines the relative cyber strengths and weaknesses each country commands today, and offers policy recommendations for the improvement of the United States' own cyberwar capabilities." READ MORE

Countering Beijing in the South China Sea. Dana Dillon, Policy Review, June/July 2011, var. pages. "The most dangerous source of instability in Asia is a rising China seeking to reassert itself, and the place China is most likely to risk a military conflict is the South China Sea. In the second decade of the 21st century, the seldom-calm waters of the South China Sea are frothing from a combination of competing naval exercises and superheated rhetoric. Many pundits, politicians, and admirals see the South China Sea as a place of future competition between powers." READ MORE

Can China Defend a “Core Interest” in the South China Sea? Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes, The Washington Quarterly, pp. 45-59. "If China is content to settle for a limited core interest—something less than complete dominance—or if it proves willing to concentrate forces to the south to the detriment of its interests elsewhere, then it could soon make good on a claim to primacy in the South China Sea. But no immediate danger seems to be in the offing."  READ MORE

The Battle for the Chinese Internet. Xiao Qiang, Journal of Democracy, April 2011, pp. 47-61. "In China, the Internet is not merely contested space between citizen and government. It is also a catalyst for social and political transformation, offering the possibility of better governance with greater citizen participation." READ MORE

Is China a responsible stakeholder? Amitai Etzioni, International Affairs, May 2011, pp. 539–553. "This article explores the concept of stakeholding and what it entails to China's international conduct. Whether China is a responsible stakeholder is evaluated from employing three sets of standards: normative, 'aspirational' standards (i.e. those that make a good community member and an upstanding citizen); rational choice (is China acting in line with shared or complementary self-interest?); and power analysis (whether China is upsetting an established world order or contributing to the formation of a new one?)." READ MORE

Why America No Longer Gets Asia. Evan A. Feigenbaum, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2011, pp. 25-43. "In short, Asia is being reborn, and remade. Yet, the United States is badly prepared for this momentous rebirth, which is at once stitching Asia back together and making the United States less relevant in each of Asia’s constituent parts. Asians are, in various ways, passing the United States by, restoring ancient ties, and repairing long-broken strategic and economic links. The United States will not cease to be a power in Asia, particularly in East Asia where Washington remains an essential strategic balancer, vital to stability. That security-related role has been reinforced in recent months, as China’s behavior has scared its neighbors silly, from Japan to Vietnam to India. But unless U.S. policymakers adapt to the contours of a more integrated Asia, and soon, they will miss opportunities in every part of the region over time—and find the United States less relevant to Asia’s future." READ MORE

A Rising, Emboldened China. Richard S. Williamson, Mediterranean Quarterly, Winter 2011, pp. 15-26. "The essay offers an in-depth account of China's assertiveness in world affairs, an analysis of its own emerging contradictions, and how it must reconcile economic development and the inevitable growth of the middle class that will, sooner or later, demand political freedoms. China's influence in the global financial system constitutes the core of the author's analysis. The author also describes the challenges faced by the US from China as a rising competitor for superpower status. READ MORE

China’s “Networked Authoritarianism.” Rebecca MacKinnon, Journal of Democracy, April 2011, pp. 32-46. "Chinese authoritarianism has deftly adapted to the Internet Age, employing various forms of technological controls. China’s brand of networked authoritarianism serves as a model for other regimes, such as those of Iran and Russia." READ MORE

Why is China going nuclear? Yun Zhou. Energy Policy, July 2010, var. pages. "In November 2007, China's State Council approved its 'Medium- and Long-Term Nuclear Power Development Plan', which set as a goal to increase the nation's nuclear capacity from about 7 to 40 GWe by 2020. In March 2008, the National Development and Reform Commission suggested installed nuclear power capacity might even exceed 60 GWe by 2020 due to faster than expected construction. Even with this growth, nuclear power's share of China's installed total capacity would be only about 5 percent. Yet China's rapid nuclear expansion poses serious financial, political, security, and environmental challenges. This study investigates China's claim that nuclear energy is necessary to meet its growing energy demands by analyzing China's energy alternatives and assessing their likelihood of contributing to total Chinese capacity. By looking at China's transformative energy policy from several perspectives, this study finds that nuclear energy is indeed a necessity for China." READ MORE

The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy. Thomas J Christensen. Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2011. var. pp. "Over the past two years, in a departure from the policy of reassurance it adopted in the late 1990s, China has managed to damage relations with most of its neighbors and with the US. Observers claim that China has become more assertive, revising its grand strategy to reflect its own rise and the US' decline since the financial crisis began in 2008. In fact, China's counterproductive policies toward its neighbors and the US are better understood as reactive and conservative rather than assertive and innovative. China's new policies represented more than a minor shift. Beijing was moving away from its traditional foreign policy relationships and softening, although not abolishing, its long-held and once rigid positions on sanctions and noninterference in the internal affairs of states. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Chinese citizens, lower-level government officials, and nationalist commentators in the media have often exaggerated China's rise in influence and the declining power of the US." READ MORE

Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism. Charles Glaser, Foreign Affairs, Mar/Apr 2011. var. pp. "The rise of China will likely be the most important international relations story of the twenty-first century, but it remains unclear whether that story will have a happy ending. But China's unique qualities, past behavior, and economic trajectory may well turn out to be less important in driving future events than many assume -- because how a country acts as a superpower and whether its actions and those of others will end in battle are shaped as much by general patterns of international politics as by idiosyncratic factors. China's rise need not be nearly as competitive and dangerous as the standard realist argument suggests, because the structural forces driving major powers into conflict will be relatively weak. Current international conditions should enable both the US and China to protect their vital interests without posing large threats to each other. Both the US and China will be able to maintain high levels of security now and through any potential rise of China to superpower status." READ MORE

China’s Perplexing Foreign Trade Policy: Causes, Consequences, and Solutions. Steven Rosefielde. American Foreign Policy Interests, January 2011, pp. 10–16. U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner recently vetted a plan addressed to G20 countries to cut trade imbalances to less than 4 percent of their output, a suggestion that went beyond coaxing China to appreciate the renminbi by broaching the sensitive issue of quantitative targets and controls. Geithner’s trial balloon was shouted down but deserves serious consideration by students of international affairs on seldom considered macroeconomic grounds. A cogent case can be made for the proposition that Chinese dollar reserve hoarding (underimporting), connected with Beijing’s trade surpluses, is a principal cause of America’s mass unemployment. The problem can be best solved with a ‘‘tit-for-tat’’ Axelrod-Rapoport disciplinary strategy. READ MORE

Two Essays on China’s Quest for Democracy. Liu Xiaobo, Journal of Democracy, January 2011, pp. 152-166. "Imprisoned Chinese dissident Liu Xiaobo, who was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize, is best known for his eloquent and incisive essays. Two of them are featured here: 'Can It Be That the Chinese People Deserve Only 'Party-Led Democracy'?' and 'Changing the Regime by Changing Society.'"  READ MORE

Human Rights Last. Gary J. Bass, Foreign Policy, March/April 2011, var. pages. "China's diplomats have the ear of the world's bad guys. So what are they telling them? In Zimbabwe and many other countries far from Beijing, China's hand is increasingly conspicuous these days, and its choice of friends, like the thuggish Mugabe, is increasingly under scrutiny. It used to be that the Western world lectured China most extensively about its poor human rights record at home, for detaining dissenters and silencing free speech. But as China's power and influence grow, the Chinese government now finds itself weathering criticism for its support of cruel regimes around the world. Chinese officials are newly sensitive to such reproaches, if not exactly responsive. As one Foreign Ministry official told me with surprise in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, 'For the first time, China's foreign position on human rights outweighs the world's concern for China's domestic human rights.'" READ MORE

Google Confronts China’s “Three Warfares.” Timothy L. Thomas, Parameters, Summer 2010, pp. 101-113. "In early January 2010, Google announced that a computer attack originating from China had penetrated its corporate infrastructure (in mid-December) and stolen information from its computers, most likely source code. The hackers also accessed the Gmail accounts of some human-rights activists and infiltrated the networks of 33 companies. China’s recent incursions into US military computer networks and Google’s cyber systems are of concern when viewed in isolation. They reflect a more serious problem when viewed as part of a short-term goal of conducting “preemptive reconnaissance” that accommodates a longer-term goal of affecting US military planning or the US economy. Many factors indicate that this may be China’s goal." READ MORE

China's Next Stage of Growth: Reassessing U.S. Policy toward China. Dan Steinbock, American Foreign Policy Interests, November 2010 , pp. 347 - 362. After three decades of economic reforms and opening-up policies, China is entering a new stage of development. As a result of the third wave of globalization and the ongoing global crisis, the large emerging economies are catching up. China is now moving from industrial take-off to technological maturity. This transition has been the fastest in China's more prosperous coastal regions. It is driven by an investment-led national strategy reinforced by industrialization, urbanization, and the emergence of a new middle class. Because of extraordinarily rapid growth, China is set to overtake the United States in terms of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by the 2020s. In the most prosperous urban regions, prosperity levels will catch up with those of some European nations in the course of the 2010s. The basic framework of U.S. policy toward China was created amid the peak of the cold war. There is a case to be made that basic elements should be reassessed in light of China's next stage of growth and structural shifts in the global economy. That reassessment is vital especially in U.S.-Chinese economic relations because they hold the potential to facilitate global recovery—or constrain it. READ MORE

The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU–China Strategic Partnership. Jonathan Holslag. Journal of Common Market Studies, March 2011, pp. 293–313. This article evaluates whether the Sino–European partnership can be considered strategic. At the discourse level it is found that both sides fail to identify common interests, joint priorities continue to be concentrated in the business sector, and China and Europe have not been able to determine what the relevance of their relationship is compared to other powers. In practice this is even more problematic. The strategic vacuum renders the partnership vulnerable to setbacks and means that China will be even more tempted to capitalize on Europe's internal divisions while Member States will feel less inclined to close ranks. READ MORE

Not Ready for Prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance. Jorge G. Castañeda, Foreign Affairs, Sep/Oct 2010, var. pages. "The world’s leading international institutions may be outmoded, but Brazil, China, India, and South Africa are not ready to join the helm. Their shaky commitment to democracy, human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, and environmental protection would only weaken the international system’s core values.  READ MORE

A New China Requires a New US Strategy. David Shambaugh, Current History, September 2010, pp. 219-226. "The worst thing Washington could do is to operate on autopilot, to assume that past strategies and policies (which have generally served the United States well) are ipso facto indefinitely useful." READ MORE

The Uncertain Fate of “Chindia.” Shalendra D. Sharma, Current History, September 2010, pp. 252-257. "Although Sino-Indian relations have greatly improved over the past decade, . . . [u]nresolved territorial disputes, China’s unconditional support of Pakistan, and growing competition for energy resources and regional influence could quickly derail hard-won gains." READ MORE

Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US–China Rivalry. Aaron L. Friedberg, Survival, August-September 2010, pp. 31-54. While their full effects are not yet clear, the recent financial crisis, and the global economic slowdown that followed, could have a significant impact on the evolving strategic rivalry between the United States and China. Economic issues are likely to become a source of increasing friction and tension in Sino-American relations over the next several years. At the same time, however, the after-effects of the crisis will make it much more difficult for Washington to afford an escalating arms competition with the PRC. Although China appears for the moment to have emerged in a relatively strong economic position, its seemingly rapid recovery could prove fleeting. Finally, while reports of the imminent demise of the dollar as the world's currency and the evaporation of America's soft power relative to China's are exaggerated, both developments have been made more plausible by the events of the past two years. READ MORE

China’s Afghan Dilemma. Raffaello Pantucci, Survival, August-September 2010 , pp. 21-27. The announcement that American forces in Afghanistan would start to draw down by July 2011 highlighted, for China, the need for a conversation about what exactly its interests in its neighbour are, and what it is willing to do about them. Beijing’s primary security concern with Afghanistan is the potential that instability and terrorism might be exported to China’s far-western Xinjiang province, where the ethno-separatist tendencies of the large Uighur Muslim minority have in the past been linked to al-Qaeda militancy. Currently, China is reliant on the United States and NATO to deal with Uighur separatists within Afghanistan, which occurs as a byproduct of operations against the Afghan Taliban and related groups. Many Chinese analysts remain unconvinced that NATO will succeed. Most see Afghanistan as the ‘graveyard of Empires’, an assessment they gleefully
share with foreign analysts, and which captures a residual sense amongst some Chinese planners who see the United States as an enemy whose losses are advantages to Beijing. READ MORE

China’s Caution on Afghanistan–Pakistan. Andrew Small, The Washington Quarterly, July 2010, pp. 81-97. "The ongoing crisis in Afghanistan and Pakistan looks like a prime candidate for closer cooperation between the United States and China. There are various broadly shared interests in combating terrorism, containing rising extremism, and supporting the stability of both states. With its extensive influence in Pakistan and substantial economic capacity, Beijing has important assets to bring to the table. In practice, however, efforts to achieve convergence have proved frustrating. Differences run deep over how to address the extremist threat and the broader geopolitics of the region. And as is true of its foreign policy elsewhere, China pursues a relatively narrow conception of its interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan, rather than supporting a more widely shared set of goals." READ MORE

China's Oil Strategy" "Going Out" to Iran. Wen-Sheng Chen, Asian Politics & Policy, January 2010, pp. 39-54. "China's rapid development has drawn worldwide attention and has been referred to as a "peaceful rise" in recent years. The country's booming economy feeds Beijing's insatiable thirst for sufficient, stable, and secure energy sources. This article argues that Iran's plentiful oil reserves and its capacity to produce and export vast quantities of oil make Tehran a natural partner as China pursues its goal of rising to global-power status. Furthermore, Iran's location on the 'Energy Silk Road' to China is potentially of great significance for Beijing as it seeks to break out of the 'Malacca predicament.' This article suggests that China sees an important role for Iran in securing its oil supply and pursuing a 'westward oil strategy.' The article also demonstrates that China's energy ties with Iran are constrained and conditioned by Sino-U.S. cooperation and competition and by the Middle Eastern power structure." READ MORE

China's New Energy-Security Debate. Andrew B. Kennedy, Survival, June 2010 , pages 137 - 158. China's debate over what 'energy security' is and how it can be achieved has evolved considerably over the past decade. raditionally, Chinese officials and analysts have been most worried about China's mounting oil imports, and they have expressed considerable wariness of international energy markets and institutions. This narrow and relatively nationalistic view of China's energy-security challenge has been challenged on several different fronts, however, particularly in the past five years. Prominent analysts now call for a more positive approach to international markets and institutions, and some argue that external dependence is a less important energy security challenge than the shortcomings of China's own energy system. China's broadening debate over energy security represents an opportunity for the outside world as it engages China on energy and climate change in the years ahead. READ MORE

U.S.-China Relations: Is a future confrontation looming? Roland Flamini, The CQ Researcher, May 7, 2010, pp. 409-432. "Disputes that have bedeviled relations between the United States and China for decades flared up again following President Obama's decision to sell weapons to Taiwan and receive Tibet's revered Dalai Lama. From the U.S. perspective, China's refusal to raise the value of its currency is undermining America's — and Europe's — economic recovery. Beijing also rebuffed Obama's proposal of 'a partnership on the big global issues of our time.' In addition, the Chinese insist on tackling their pollution problems in their own way, and have been reluctant to support U.S. diplomatic efforts to impose tough sanctions on nuclear-minded Iran. With the central bank of China holding more than $800 billion of the U.S. national debt in the form of Treasury notes, and their economy speeding along at a 9 percent growth rate, the Chinese are in no mood to be accommodating." READ MORE

The Geography of Chinese Power. Robert D. Kaplan, Foreign Affairs, May-June 2010, var. pages. "Thanks to the country’s favorable location on the map, China's influence is expanding on land and at sea, from Central Asia to the South China Sea and from the Russian Far East to the Indian Ocean." READ MORE

China’s Perspective on a Nuclear-Free World. Hui Zhang, The Washington Quarterly, April 2010, pp. 139-155. "Beijing believes that all nuclear states should adopt a no-first-use policy and redefine the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines. Although China stands ready to support the nuclear-free agenda, it is up to the two countries with the overwhelming number of the world’s warheads to take the lead."   READ MORE

Think Again: China Military. Drew Thompson, Foreign Policy, Mar/Apr 2010, pp. 86-90. "After two decades of massive military spending to modernize its armed forces, amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars, China increasingly has the ability to challenge the US in its region, if not yet outside it. But the ability to project force tells people very little about China's willingness to use it. Certainly, China has made moves over the last few years that have stoked the China-is-a-dangerous-threat crowd in Washington. In May 2008, satellite imagery revealed that China had constructed a massive subterranean naval base on the southern island of Hainan, presumably a staging point to launch naval operations into the Pacific. But it's probably too soon for Americans to panic. Many experts who've looked closely at the matter agree that China today simply does not have the military capability to challenge the US in the Pacific. Arguably, the more significant figure for comparison is defense spending. Here the People's Liberation Army lags far behind the Pentagon." READ MORE

The United States and Asia in 2009: Public Diplomacy and Strategic Continuity. François Godement, Asian Survey, Jan/Feb 2010, pp. 8-24. "In crafting an Asia policy during the first year of his presidency, Obama has faced the dilemma of continuing much of his predecessor’s policies while answering public expectations for change. A military surge in Afghanistan after a long debate, an attempt to enhance strategic cooperation with China, a disappointing result for climate change policies, a better disposition toward regional organizations, and a growing concern with the course of Japan’s alliance policy have been the main threads of a deeply pragmatic approach." READ MORE

China's Next Stage of Growth: Reassessing U.S. Policy toward China. Dan Steinbock, American Foreign Policy Interests, November 2010 , pp. 347 - 362. After three decades of economic reforms and opening-up policies, China is entering a new stage of development. As a result of the third wave of globalization and the ongoing global crisis, the large emerging economies are catching up. China is now moving from industrial take-off to technological maturity. This transition has been the fastest in China's more prosperous coastal regions. It is driven by an investment-led national strategy reinforced by industrialization, urbanization, and the emergence of a new middle class. Because of extraordinarily rapid growth, China is set to overtake the United States in terms of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by the 2020s. In the most prosperous urban regions, prosperity levels will catch up with those of some European nations in the course of the 2010s. The basic framework of U.S. policy toward China was created amid the peak of the cold war. There is a case to be made that basic elements should be reassessed in light of China's next stage of growth and structural shifts in the global economy. That reassessment is vital especially in U.S.-Chinese economic relations because they hold the potential to facilitate global recovery—or constrain it. READ MORE

The Elusive Axis: Assessing the EU–China Strategic Partnership. Jonathan Holslag. Journal of Common Market Studies, March 2011, pp. 293–313. This article evaluates whether the Sino–European partnership can be considered strategic. At the discourse level it is found that both sides fail to identify common interests, joint priorities continue to be concentrated in the business sector, and China and Europe have not been able to determine what the relevance of their relationship is compared to other powers. In practice this is even more problematic. The strategic vacuum renders the partnership vulnerable to setbacks and means that China will be even more tempted to capitalize on Europe's internal divisions while Member States will feel less inclined to close ranks. READ MORE