Tab 1 lists
Tab 2 lists
Tab 3 provides a set of
Journal Articles
Disclaimer: The materials in this section are from sources outside the U.S. Government and should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein or as official U.S. policy.
INVASIVE PROCEDURES. Ian Bremmer, National Interest, March-April 2008, var. pages. "The governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, two countries of vital interest to the United States, are in danger of collapse. Whatever optimistic policy makers and presidential candidates may say, Washington has few remaining tools with which to minimize real risks of state failure. The coming year will be critical for the survival of both governments. READ MORE
IRAQ FIVE YEARS ON: BEYOND THE DEMONS. Laith Kubba, The World Today, March 2008, pp. 4-6. "Five years after the invasion of Iraq, 'shock and awe' has quite different connotations. Ruthless power blocs now hold the country at their mercy. The only way forward is to put the pieces back together in a different pattern, involving regional states in the solution rather than the problem." READ MORE
IRAQ: WHAT IF WE WIN? Anonymous, The American Interest, March/April 2008, var. pages. "Thanks to a fragile but real improvement in the security situation in Iraq, it has become possible to imagine the United States and its allies achieving what could plausibly be described as a win. But a win how defined, and with what implications? We asked a diverse group of observers to ponder these questions." READ MORE
REAL LEADERS DO SOFT POWER: LEARNING THE LESSONS OF IRAQ. James B. Steinberg, The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2008, pp. 155–164. "Policymaking is an inherently imprecise science. History does not permit us to stage controlled experiments, to test the outcomes of the 'what if.' Yet, the Bush administration’s decision to pursue a bold policy departure from mainstream U.S. national security strategy does offer a kind of laboratory to examine why policy choices matter and to understand the nature of the international system at the beginning of the twenty-first century as well as the appropriate role for U.S. leadership within that system." READ MORE
HISTORY AND POLICY: THE CASE OF IRAQ. Bruce Kuklick, European Journal of American Studies, January 2008, var. pages. “The decision by Americans to go to war against Iraq has appeared to be such a colossal mistake that it has called forth many condemnations by historically minded intellectuals. What is the connection between history and policy-making? What is the role of the historian, qua historian, in contributing to today’s appraisals? These questions require far more consideration than they have been given, because scholars have oversimplified historical evaluations of American policies in the attempt to show the current leadership in the United States to be uniquely clumsy or malign. Moreover, in their zeal to condemn the war, historically minded academics have fallen into confusion about the nature of historical knowing.” READ MORE
Stability, Reconstruction Skills Key to Long Lasting Security. Lawrence P. Farrell Jr. National Defense. January 2008, online article. As U.S. forces carry out the difficult job of stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq, civilian and military leaders are beginning to realize that this nation-building expertise will be critical in the future. READ MORE
GEOPOLITICAL ANALYSIS OF A PARTITIONED IRAQ: POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND MILITARY VIABILITY. Vanzo, John P. A World Affairs, Spring 2007, pp. 155-160. "If the definition of success in Iraq has been a moving target, one definition of abject political failure has remained a constant: the fragmentation of the country into separate, possibly warring ethnoreligious enclaves. Despite the administration's best efforts, recent events indicate that civil war and territorial partition are increasingly likely outcomes. This article offers a heuristic exploration of a fragmented Iraq." READ MORE
America’s Global Role after Bush. Bruce W. Jentleson. Survival, Sept 2007, pp. 179 - 200. The next American president’s foreign policy will be conducted in the face of two main challenges. One is the legacy of George W. Bush: Iraq in particular, and a substantially weakened US strategic position in general. The other emanates from the broad forces shaping our era – particularly the geopolitical transition that began with the end of the Cold War, the changing nature of security threats, and globalization – that would have posed a formidable challenge to any administration. READ MORE
Last Resort and Preemption: Using Armed Force as a Moral and Penultimate Choice. Eric Wester . Parameters US Army War College Quarterly, Summer 2007, pp. 59-70. This article argues that using armed force in peace enforcement operations (PEO) need not be reserved for a Last Resort even while preserving the integrity of JustWar theory. It aims to deepen the ethical discussion regarding the relevance of Last Resort as a consideration for the use of armed force, specifically in PEO. READ MORE
Kutler, Glenn. U.S. MILITARY FATALITIES IN IRAQ IN
PERSPECTIVE: YEAR 4. Orbis, Summer 2007, pp. 511-527.
Full text available upon request
"As year five begins, the prospects for a successful conclusion of
the Iraq war – one that would repair the deep seated and deadly
animosities throughout civil society, establish a foundation for a
sustainable democratic government, and stop the inexorable climb of
U.S. fatalities above 3,000 and of total casualties toward 30,000
and beyond - are remote. The U.S. is embroiled in a conflict in
three dimensions, military political and civil, that defies
solution. Our military and its leaders have tended to underestimate
the enemy and engage it half-heartedly, while the insurgents have
retained freedom of action and repeatedly seized the initiative. The
fourth dimension, the battle for Iraqi hearts and minds, essential
for bringing hostilities to an end, has not even begun." Glenn
Kutler has contributed a weekly analysis of Iraq war fatalities to
Casualties.org since 2003 and is principal of Fulcrum Capital, llc,
based in Philadelphia. This article continues a series begun with
his “U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq: A Two-Year Retrospective” (Orbis,
Summer 2005) and “U.S. Military Fatalities in Iraq: Year 3” (Orbis,
Summer 2006).
Byman, Daniel and Kenneth Pollack. KEEPING THE LID
ON. The National Interest, May/June 2007, pp. 58-65.
Full text available via ProQuest
"If the surge fails, it is imperative that the United States have a plan for containing the Iraqi civil war. As painful as it may be to admit that the U.S. effort to bring peace and stability to Iraq has failed, our new priority must become preventing the Iraqi conflict from spilling over and destabilizing neighboring states. This will not be easy. In fact, the history of states trying to contain the 'spillover' from civil wars suggests that it will be very hard for the United States to do so. But planning now may allow the United States to mitigate spillover's worst effects." Daniel Byman is the Director of the Center for Peace and security Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and a non-resident senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution. Kenneth Pollack is the Director of Research of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.
Cumings, Bruce. THE AMERICAN WAY OF GOING TO WAR:
MEXICO (1846) TO IRAQ (2003). Orbis, March 2007, pp.
195-215.
Full text available upon request
"Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into 'firing the first shot.' This strategy of 'passive defense' amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy."
Esposito, John L and Dalia Mogahed. BATTLE FOR MUSLIMS'
HEARTS AND MINDS: THE ROAD NOT (YET) TAKEN. Middle East
Policy, Spring 2007, pp. 27-41.
Full text available from publisher's website
“Western images of terrorist attacks and suicide bombings in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Indonesia are countered in the Muslim world by the invasion and occupation of Iraq, abuses at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, and images of civilian deaths and destruction from the Israeli invasions of Gaza and Lebanon. Muslim feelings of humiliation and powerlessness are compounded by the widespread belief that not only the prospect of democracy but also Islam and Islamic tradition, sources of power and strength for renewal and future success, are under siege by Western dominance.” Dr. Esposito is University Professor of Religion & International Affairs and director of the Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. Ms. Mogahed is a Gallup strategic analyst and executive director of Gallup Muslim Studies. Their forthcoming book, "Who Speaks for Islam? Listening to the Voices of a Billion Muslims," is scheduled for publication in 2007.
Dodge, Toby. THE CAUSES OF US FAILURE IN IRAQ.
Survival, Spring 2007, pp.
85–106.
Full text available upon request
"None of the proposals for extracting the United States from the
debacle in Iraq recognise the root causes of the violence and
instability that has plagued the country since April 2003. The
origins of the Iraqi civil war lie in the complete collapse of both
the administrative and coercive capacity of the state. The Iraqi
state, its ministries, their
civil servants, police force and army ceased to exist in a
meaningful way in the aftermath of regime change. It is the United
States’ inability to reconstruct them that lies at the heart of the
Iraq problem. Until the state’s capacity is substantially rebuilt –
if ever – Iraq will continue to be violently unstable. Unless the
United States can commit to the generation-long project of
rebuilding the Iraqi state, Iraq will continue to be a place of
misery for its population and instability for its region. This is a
defeat of historic proportions for US foreign policy." Toby
Dodge is a Senior Consulting Fellow for the Middle East at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies and a Reader in
International Politics, Department of Politics, Queen Mary,
University of London.
Lopez, Andrea. ENGAGING OR WITHDRAWING, WINNING OR LOSING? THE
CONTRADICTIONS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN AND IRAQ.
Third World Quarterly, March
2007, pp. 245 – 260.
Full text available upon request
"In the late summer and autumn of 2003, facing increasingly violent opposition in both Afghanistan and Iraq, the USA implemented contrasting policies. In Afghanistan, it began to expand its footprint, creating Provincial Reconstruction Teams (prts) around the country. In Iraq, on the other hand, the US military withdrew from cities, garrisoning itself in armed camps. Despite the worsening situations in 2005 - 06, this paper argues that establishing prts in Afghanistan is a policy that should be repeated elsewhere, albeit with significantly more personnel deployed to a country. It is far more in line with counterinsurgency theory and US military doctrine, acting to win the support of the population. In Iraq, however, the more consolidated US bases helped to set the stage for the worsening situation and should not be allowed in future conflicts. Although they lessened the danger to US forces, they contradicted counterinsurgency policy and theory in other ways, creating vacuums of power into which guerrillas could enter. More broadly this trend is characteristic of a wider policy failure on the part of the USA and reflects the profound contradictions of Washington's approach to counterinsurgency both before and after 2003." Andrea M Lopez is in the Department of Political Science, Susquehanna University, PA.
Allin, Dana H. American Power and Allied Restraint: Lessons
of Iraq. Survival, March 2007, pp 123 - 140.
Full text available upon request
Sometime during the Cold War, transatlantic relations became a dialogue about appeasement. They were always about much more than that, of course, and even the appeasement argument ran in both directions. Well before Richard Perle complained of the West Germans, ‘you couldn’t get past the “Guten Morgen” before they would urge the abandonment of one NATO position or another’, West Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt was complaining about John F. Kennedy’s cautious response to the raising of a Berlin Wall: ‘Inaction or merely defensive action could provoke a crisis of confidence in the Western powers. Because of catastrophic mistakes in Iraq, the US has yet to emerge from a long tunnel: Middle East chaos and domestic recriminations are likely to preoccupy the United States for years to come. When it does emerge, America will not find that European allies have any greater monopoly on wisdom than it has. But it still might be useful to listen to advice.Dana H. Allin is the IISS Senior Fellow for Transatlantic Affairs and Editor of Survival .
Fearon, James D. IRAQ'S CIVIL WAR. Foreign
Affairs, March/April 2007, pp. 2-15.
Article Available from Publisher's website.
"The White House still avoids the label, but by any reasonable historical standard, the Iraqi civil war has begun. The record of past such wars suggests that Washington cannot stop this one -- and that Iraqis will be able to reach a power-sharing deal only after much more fighting, if then. The United States can help bring about a settlement eventually by balancing Iraqi factions from afar, but there is little it can do to avert bloodshed now." James D. Fearon is Geballe Professor in the School of Humanities and Sciences and Professor of Political Science at Stanford University.
Nasr, Vali et al. WHO WINS IN IRAQ? Foreign
Policy, March/April 2007, pp. 40-51.
Full text available upon request
"Newspaper headlines consistently remind us of the failures coming out of Iraq. But, if wars always produce losers, it is also true that most wars have their fair share of winners, too. So, four years into the fighting, what institutions, countries, ideas, or individuals are better off because of the war? Who, in essence, are Iraq’s winners?" Vali Nasr is professor at the Naval Postgraduate School and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is author of The Shia Revival: How Conflicts Within Islam Will Shape the Future (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006).
Lang, Col. W. Patrick Jr. WHAT IRAQ TELLS US ABOUT
OURSELVES. Foreign Policy, Web Exclusive,
Posted February 2007.
Colonel W. Patrick Lang Jr., a retired Army colonel and member of the Senior Executive Service, who served with the Special Forces in Vietnam, as an Arabic professor at West Point, and as chief defense intelligence officer for the Middle East, presents the provocative argument that the true root of the problem in Iraq is the perception of foreigners held by most Americans, who “mistakenly believe that when we say that ‘all men are created equal,’ it means that all people are the same.” He criticizes U.S. foreign policy as tending to be “predicated on the notion that everyone wants to be an American” and contends that we “invaded an imaginary Iraq that fit into our vision of the world. We invaded Iraq in the sure belief that inside every Iraqi there was an American trying to get out. In our dream version of Iraq, we would be greeted as not only liberators from the tyrant, but more importantly, from the old ways.” It is vital that we learn to “deal with alien peoples on their own terms, and within their own traditions” if we are to avoid another such catastrophe.
Bassam, Yousif. ECONOMIC
RESTRUCTURING IN IRAQ: INTENDED AND UNINTENDED
CONSEQUENCES. Journal of Economic Issues,
March 2007. pp 43-60.
Full text available upon request
The article outlines the political and economic challenges in Iraq as they relate to the U.S. invasion. The author identifies the tensions, sparked by religious practice, between sectarian and ethnic groups. A brief history of Iraq's battles with economic capital is presented. Economic sanctions and the oil for food program are explored. According to Iraq's Central Statistical Organization (CSO), the country is facing increased insecurity and unemployment. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) handles labor and union activity. Demobilizing the army increased civil violence and efforts to reconstruct do not utilize capital-intensive techniques. U.S. sponsored economic policies in Iraq have contributed to part of the problem. Bassam is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics at Indiana State University.
Creveld van, Martin.
The Fall:
Consequences of US Withdrawal From Iraq
New Perspectives Quarterly, Winter 2007, online
article.
Full text available from publisher website
Now that the American people have recognized that the war in Iraq is hopeless, what comes next? The answer is, the US is going to cut its losses and withdraw. Withdrawing 140,000 soldiers with all their equipment is a very complex operation. In 1945 and 1973, the US simply evacuated its troops, leaving most of its equipment to its West European and South Vietnamese protégés respectively. This time, however, things are different. So precious is modern defense equipment that not even the largest power on earth can afford to abandon large quantities of it; in this respect, the model is the First Gulf War, not Vietnam or World War II. Martin van Creveld, a professor at Hebrew University in Jerusalem, is considered one of the world’s most eminent experts on military history and strategy.
Ottaway, Marina. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IRAQ?
Current History, January 2007, pp. 42-43.
Full text available upon request
The author, director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Middle East program, finds today’s Iraq “a broken country without central authority” straddling both internal ethnosectarian conflicts and external insecurity caused by the rise of Shiite power from Iran and its impact across the Middle East. National reconciliation has failed, says the author, who instead advocates the de facto partitioning of Iraq into autonomous regions. “The solution to a situation that has spun out of control is beyond the capacity of the United States to devise and above all to implement on its own,” the author says, leaving little option but to engage with the Iraqi people and their neighbors rather than continuing attempts to play “the dominant force that can reshape the region to suit its goals.”
Anonymous. INTO THE ABYSS: REPORTING IRAQ 2003-2006: AN
ORAL HISTORY. Columbia Journalism Review,
November/December 2006, online edition
In the fall of 2006, CJR interviewed journalists who have covered the war in Iraq. The personal nature of the anecdotes and insights that were gathered communicated the reality of what Iraqis call “the situation” much more forcefully than yards of standard prose. The resulting narrative, a unique transcript of oral history, describes circumstances that “nearly defy belief” about the media coverage of one of the most significant stories of our time.
Zelnick, Robert. IRAQ: LAST CHANCE.
Policy Review, December 2006 & January 2007, var. pages.
Full text available from publisher website
"To concede that going to war in Iraq was a grave mistake of
policy is not to embrace the conclusion that an immediate
pull-out — or one by a declared date moderated by conditions on
the ground — would today serve U.S. interests. The country may
have entered the war with erroneous notions of the state of
Saddam’s wmd programs. It may have underestimated the resilience
of former Baathists and regime loyalists, their access to
weapons and the help they would get from foreign jihadists. It
may have failed to anticipate that a society divided and
oppressed by an authoritarian ruler might erupt into ethnic and
religious conflict when that leader departs. It may have been
naïve in thinking that an externally modeled Iraqi democratic
government would opt for secular rather than sectarian
parliamentary representation and that its near perfect
transition would transform the region into a galaxy of
democratic states. And it may have underestimated the number of
troops needed to occupy a country of 25 million. Yet the answer
is not to compound those mistakes by leaving in a way that makes
large-scale civil war nearly inevitable, pushes the country into
the lap of its Iranian neighbor, or advertises the U.S. as an
unreliable friend, a hesitant hegemon, and a rewarder of those
terrorists with the tenacity to outlast the behemoth. No, when a
Great Power puts its leg in a snare, there must be some cure
other than amputation." Robert Zelnick is Chairman of the
Department of Journalism at Boston University and a Research
Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
Powers, Jonathan. IRAQ’S YOUTH IN A
TIME OF WAR.
SAIS Review, Summer-Fall 2006, pp. 17-28.
Full text available from publisher website
“The war in Iraq continues to have a detrimental affect on millions of Iraqi youth. Although billions of dollars are being spent on the war, not enough attention has been paid to enabling these youth to be part of Iraq's reconstruction. Yet the vast majority of the country's population is under 25 years old. As a result, many youth are being recruited as paid-for-hire insurgents and adding to the perpetual mayhem and violence. This article will explore the current struggle that Iraqi youth face and suggest ways to ameliorate their increasingly desperate position and help them find a better future. It argues that the United States and the international community should increase their support for efforts to engage Iraqi youth in their country's state-building efforts. This is crucial for increasing the stability in that country and throughout the region.” Jonathan Powers, an Iraq veteran, spent 14 months in Baghdad and Najaf as a Captain in the Army’s 1st Armored Division and later as a civilian. He is now the Program Manager of War Kids Relief, a project of the Veterans for America aimed at assisting the youth of Iraq.
Cassidy, Robert M. THE LONG SMALL
WAR: INDIGENOUS FORCES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY. Parameters, Summer
2006, pp. 15-29.
Full text available via publishers website
Summary: Robert Cassidy, a major in the U.S. Army, discusses the potential use of indigenous forces in Iraq and Afghanistan today. Citing examples from past wars, Cassidy argues that properly utilizing these forces could lead to "achieved significant results." Among these results are exponential increases in the forces prosecuting counterinsurgency, better knowledge of the terrain and environment, and more actionable intelligence about the enemy. Although misuse can lead to vulnerabilities, the deliberate and early employment of indigenous forces can expand the quality and quantity of forces conducting pacification and counter-insurgency, leading to an effective method in achieving success in today's war. Lieutenant Colonel Robert M. Cassidy has served in leadership and staff positions in the 4th Infantry Division, the 8th Infantry Division, the 82d Airborne Division, Third Army, and Seventh Army. He is a graduate of the French Joint Defense College and has a Ph.D. in international security studies from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.
Diamond, Larry, James Dobbins, Chaim Kaufmann, Leslie H.
Gelb, and Stephen Biddle. WHAT TO DO IN IRAQ: A ROUNDTABLE.
Foreign Affairs, July/August 2006, var. pages.
Full text available from publisher website
"Can anything -- international mediation, regional collaboration, decentralization, or constitutional negotiations -- still save Iraq from a full-fledged civil war and the Bush administration from a foreign policy fiasco? Four experts discuss Stephen Biddle trenchant analysis, ('Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,' March/April 2006) where he argued that the escalating violence in Iraq is not a nationalist insurgency, as was the Vietnam War, but rather a 'communal civil war' and that it must therefore be addressed by pursuing a strategy different from Vietnamization.' Biddle responds to their analysis and looks into their converging and diverging points of view." Larry Diamond, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, James Dobbins directs the International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND Corporation, Chaim Kaufmann is Associate Professor of International Relations at Lehigh University. Leslie H. Gelb is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations. Stephen Biddle is a Senior Fellow in Defense Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Albright, Madeleine. IRAQ AND KOSOVO: A
MEDITATION ON AMERICAN POWER. New Perspectives Quarterly. Fall 2005,
pp. 27-30
Full text available from publisher website
Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright discusses recent American interventions in Kosovo and Iraq. She feels that events in Iraq are currently not going in the direction originally envisioned by the Bush administration. In Kosovo, Albright also acknowledges things did not happen as planned. Americans always want interventions to be completed quickly, but political processes take time and require sustained attention to complete the job. Albright feels, though, that the U.S. should continue to act, when necessary, because no other country can have the same impact. Madeleine Albright was US secretary of state during the second term of the Clinton administration.
Woods, Kevin and James Lacey et al. SADDAM'S
DELUSIONS: THE VIEW FROM THE INSIDE.
Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006, var. pages.
Full text available from publisher website
"A special, double-length article from the upcoming May/June issue of Foreign
Affairs, presenting key excerpts from the recently declassified book-length
report of the USJFCOM Iraqi Perspectives Project. This distillation of the
Pentagon's secret study of Saddam Hussein's regime, based on analysis of
captured documents and prisoner interviews, has already rewritten the history of
the war. See for yourself what made Saddam tick, why he was shocked by the
American invasion, and what he was actually doing with WMD." Kevin Woods is a
defense analyst in Washington, D.C. James Lacey is a military analyst for the
U.S. Joint Forces Command. Williamson Murray is Class of 1957 Distinguished
Visiting Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Academy. Along with Mark Stout
and Michael Pease, they were the principal participants in the USJFCOM Iraqi
Perspectives Project.
Heinze, Eric A. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE WAR IN
IRAQ: NORMS, DISCOURSE, AND STATE PRACTICE.
Parameters, Spring 2006, pp. 20-34.
Full text available from publisher website
"Dr. Eric A. Heinze provides readers with an insightful analysis of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention as justification for the exercise of military power. The author questions whether such factors as motive, the level of human suffering, use of military force as a last resort, prospects for success, proportionality, and right authority must be taken into account when developing plans for any legitimate humanitarian intervention. Heinze’s analysis of these factors, especially as they apply to the US involvement in Iraq, leaves the reader with the understanding that such military action has greater legitimacy than many would have us believe." Dr. Eric A. Heinze is Assistant Professor in Political Science and International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma, in Norman. Dr. Heinze teaches and does research in the areas of international law and organization, conflict studies, human rights, US foreign policy, and international ethics.
